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
2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Addressees as listed below


SUBJECT : Intelligence Community Conference,  
[redacted] 9 - 10 November 1973

Following are the attendees who are scheduled for the  
Intelligence Community Conference from 1300 hours, 9 November  
through 1800 hours, 10 November [redacted]


General Daniel O. Graham



Support Officer for the Conference is [redacted]



cc:



AO/DCI

E2 IMPDET CL BY [redacted]

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

## Remarks:

Please join us for cocktails Fri. evening. It is possible that some of us may wish to stay on through the evening Saturday and return Sunday. Can you accommodate this? The probability that we ~~will~~ is very low... (snacks only).

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ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WD59, Hq. <div></div>	11/2/73
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FORM 1-6

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Danny Graham

SUBJECT : Preliminary Thoughts in Response to your  
Request of several weeks ago and in preparation  
for IC Planning Session [REDACTED]

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1. The objective of the D/DCI/IC is to establish an effective review mechanism to help the DCI to carry out the President's Directive, i.e., monitor and evaluate US Intelligence performance and present annually to the President Consolidated Intelligence Program Budget recommendations. The IC role in this context will be generally problem centered -- one set of problems dealing with Community products, their content, timeliness and adequacy in fulfilling consumer needs -- the other dealing with Community resource needs, their use, and the investment commitment of people and dollars over time into the various systems along with some measures of operations in terms of output.

2. Our job is to organize our processes to treat these matters from a systems viewpoint. Thus, we need to be aware of and involved as a staff in the interdependency of Community collection, processing and production activities. Our methods are largely empirical, and in my view derive from the resource and product role only. Our influence will vary but generally will be through NSCIC, USIB and IRAC, through resource allocation and evaluation methods and through the DCI's direct promotion of a quality product with consumers. Our "tool kit" has been laid out in many other papers in my "white book." What kind of personnel

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do we need, for how long, how will our procedures be established so  
as to apply a systems orientation to IC Staff operations?

3. As the Director's management team linking with the USIB, the  
production agencies and the NIOs in involving him in substantive and  
managerial concerns, we are a bridge to the institutional structures of  
the Community, to consumers across government, to resource sources  
such as the Office of Management and Budget, the Congress, and other  
external bodies, e.g., the PFIAB, Murphy Commission, special study  
groups, etc. We must establish and understand these tasks among our  
Staff and develop a responsive machinery. That is the key task   
and after.

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4. The present DCI sees the formulation and accountability of  
substantive and resource objectives as fundamental to this process. They  
will require constant attention. They will require futuristic focus. Over  
time they will impact on IC tasking. Structurally we must stay loose. For  
example, the form and shape of collection and processing assessment work  
can materially change as some of the technical issues in special programs  
evolve. Success in getting resource review properly done in agencies could  
alter our resource task. NIOs and PRG might combine in concept, etc.  
As we promulgate formal ground rules in the form of procedures, DCIDs, etc.  
the dynamic character of the IC job needs to be foremost in our minds.

5. A few observations need to be set down in this context as  
they effect our Staff's operational methods.

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a. IC has perceived itself as three or four groups. We are not that. We are one small office. We have many tasks. We have multiple skills, but we are only one act, not four. I see the front office job as running one program which interfaces with the Community and presses the initiative on multiple fronts.

b. As you are well aware, there exists, in the organization of the Intelligence Community, a high degree of interchange among technical and producer groups. This is found both institutionally and in the informal communications network through which assessments are made and program coordination and feedback occurs. (Indeed the post-mortem is beginning to document the potency of this network.) Analyst talks to analyst across program lines. Watch officers confer. Joint R&D activities get arranged across compartmented systems between and among "colleagues." Even the real budget decisions are made on a one-to-one relationship and in a bargaining context. Common document systems and exchanges are under constant informal review and attitudes toward them are clearer in the informal than

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within more structured approaches. The list is long. Even the continuous program budgeting mechanisms required of all managers provide significant visibility of one another's activities and generates considerable exchange of judgments which induce a form of coordination in both substantive and resource matters.

The trick for our people is to understand and "feel" the subtleties of how these systems work. They need to get this already existing and powerful coordinative framework (old boy net) working at achieving the objectives we want to highlight. Given our present mix this will take time. The formal systems can help get us there. For example, the procedural coordination in program review is well laid on. "Old boy nets" exist with MPRRG people. The cross program reviews which derive from that mechanism  have only begun the kind of dialogue we need. For our planning purposes a key here is to marshal the talent mix in Collection and Processing, carefully

select the right review studies and be certain the results cause some decisions in resource determinations. (The kind of coverage COINS is receiving with Hall is a good example of how not to proceed, i.e., without debate over options or challenge to assumptions. It is too empirical and non-futuristic in orientation.)

c. The Community's systems still lack proper emphasis on results-orientation. Planning and coordination at the top, even two years after the President's 5 November Directive, falls far short. But, a penetrating commitment has begun to evolve to get on with the task. Conflicts on priorities; e.g., National/Tactical, Photo/SIGINT mix, processing methodologies, etc. will always need special study and resolution within the Community structure directed at the top. Some of this has finally begun. If we use NSCIC, USIB, ExComs and IRAC mechanisms for the introduction and resolution of these conflicts they can become effective top planning bodies. The IC Staff investment in promoting their use in this way will be one important consideration in our work program and influence our staffing patterns.

d. We now have a new player in Community coordination.



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The NIO process as defined, will build upon and enhance the substantive exchange and feedback mechanisms referred to in 5b. The NIO concept extends a principle of dealing on a man-to-man, expert-to-expert basis through the chain of command. (The latter will become proforma in terms of organizational development and coordination practice.) The NIOs treat with the product by specialized groups all around town and in a bread-and-butter sense. It is fair to assume that they will be accepted quickly into the loop. They will be seen as the DCI's alter ego and a source of communication to him, not on substance alone but on consumer feedback reactions, planning problems and, on resource issues as well.

6. I doubt that the road to acceptability into the "loop" of the D/DCI/IC people dealing with substance will be as open as that of the NIOs. First, our focus will not be as current as working the estimates will be. Second, generally we are likely to be looked upon as having membership in an institutional and command sense. This will be required to explain our presence and "sell" it. Third, IC Staff will represent the Director in the role of both the advisor and antagonist. Lurking beyond

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these obstacles however and clearly in the President's Directive, is the DCI's responsibility for resource review. This responsibility is in the minds of all. It buys IC a key place at the table. But, it is one on which all elements of the Community keep a watchful eye.

7. I am impressed that our Staff effectiveness will in a large part depend on our choosing a "correct" boundary for analysis and content coverage in the Community's "open system." The post-mortem study, the KIQs, the SIGINT mix study, along with a key role in the ExCom's are proper IC work and "keys to the kingdom." They are establishing a good presence and reflect sound initiatives. In setting up our program and for each such participation we need to ask how complete both our involvement and the information sought for analyses must be. I repeat the conviction that if a study subject will provide specific product or resource alternatives, for decision and action by the DCI or the Community, then it is worth placing on our list.

8. One of the scale resources in this context is time. Each effort is not a one-shot process. It is related into a continuous process. Thus, the importance of continuity of effort, our record structure, and our evaluative methods cannot be overstated. We must keep track of why decisions are made, of our inputs, and the effectiveness of the process we introduce. For example, what specific use has been made

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25X↑ of the perspectives? How much influence did DCI inputs have over ASD(I) resource decisions? How effective is our "account executive" concept? Are we leading the exploration in improving the product or reacting to others? If leading, what are the next steps? How much investment of time and people shall we make on decrement exercises, construction of  resource reporting and evaluation systems, secondary approaches like training studies, personnel studies, etc.?

9. Some reliance can be placed upon the competition among entities and systems to achieve optimization of both product and resource decisions in the Community. This will be particularly true if the pressure is kept on resource availability by the President, the Congress and the DCI. That pressure itself will be a change agent, and if carefully managed, can provide a "force" for improved performance. This takes on serious significance to our monitoring process. How can the IC Staff establish a sharp program diagnosis to identify key parameters for collection and processing from a product output viewpoint?

One way is to play a major role with program managers in costing alternative strategies and in persuading the DCI to take a position with respect to these strategies in his program budget recommendations.

(Note: The program structures of the Community need considerable adjustment to be responsive however.) We need to have some brain

storming on this question too. A search for specifics not just philosophy will be pursued with the Groups in our [ ] meeting and follow-up sessions no doubt.

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10. In this spirit, our orientation should be futuristic and not caught up in a reactive bind. Of course some reactive work is inevitable. But, brush fires are probably best treated at their source and in most cases we are one or two steps removed. We represent in the minds of people concerned another precinct with only minor fire equipment and at best only modest comprehension. This isn't to suggest creative ideas should not be introduced but we must guard against the danger of chasing fire trucks because its exciting.

11. Resource constraints and lagging technologies will detract from a new venture focus. The DCI/IC Staff cannot overlook this and we must be bold in preventing the legitimatizing of actions which have been in the system and therefor forever "preserved." The resource review process tends to bring commitments of this type to the surface and we need to be vocal indeed in the NFIPB and elsewhere. Where the commitments are creative and innovative usually they carry enough persuasion to get incremental funding and political support. The key question is how much is enough? Sufficiency is the real test not final guidance.

25X1 12. If past practice is an indicator, the IC Staff will be held outside the loop by a variety of "mutual adjustments." We can expect to run into obstacles in our interest in ocean surveillance, national/tactical interface, manpower reductions in the Central Intelligence Agency, and attempted improvement to State's foreign reporting. The important point  is to ask whether we have the experienced people with intelligence backgrounds we need and who also have natural savvy so that we are not set up as patsies or find the top few members of the D/DCI/IC group continuously overextended. It is important that Community managers and specialized groups look upon our people as qualified and thus are willing to spend some time forcefully and constructively debating the issues at hand. It pays off to lay on a matter before a paper hits the street.

13. In this context the ASD(I) and DIA both provide a significant assist potential in the DCI's managerial arsenal. We should work it as a buffer to get work accomplished. COINS is a case in point.

14. One primary investment is required in developing program budgeting, planning and a resource evaluation approach. This requires continuous and constant dialogue with all programs and a studious development of data base. A strong Community Comptroller Group, or better called Resource Management Group, provides the DCI with a critical involvement in the budget making process throughout the year and day-to-day. Our people dealing in these matters are in the loop.

They are current and informed. They are accepted as primary contributors to the decision processes by all program managers. They are not viewed as advisory only, but as co-workers who can deliver to program managers a DCI substantive judgment and evaluation.

15. Given the requirement to produce an annual report of performance and recommended budget levels to the President, the implicit commitment to track resource use and the formal justification of our needs to Congress, the importance of continuity in the resource group seems clear. We must assure that cohesiveness is retained and relationships, which in the real world are best derived from comprehensive understanding of resource use, be given our greatest support. Clearly assigned responsibility within the Staff is key. Any division of this task can be dysfunctional. Investment in manpower here will be heavy.

16. The other side of the equation and important to our evaluation of the qualitative performance of the Community is the product review function. By its nature, the Product Review Group must be much more research-oriented. It is supportive of the NIOs in their time-urgency type activity. In developing Staff levels this Group needs a high intensity of intelligence personnel specialization and aligned with an area focus. PRL is off to a good start and must have adequate manpower of about their present numbers.

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17. Supportive of both the foregoing groups is the Collection and Processing Assessment Group. The operative word here is assessment. I foresee the assignment of this Group's effort largely on specific technical problems where a Community overview above and beyond those program managers now operating these systems is desired. The assessment group should not be asked to monitor current operations in the collection and processing field in anywhere near the depth the Management Resource Group review will take. This point is key. The orientation of the Collection and Processing Review Group should be analysis on matters that will assist planning and relate directly to resource decision and allocation judgments. We can get a few brownie points by improving the technical systems, but if the result is not resource demonstrated, those points will not get much score.

18. In sum: we have one office, numerous activities, and some logical compartmentation. Program coordination and direction has not been good from the front office. It will be better. To get there I want to monitor and pass on both the processes and the methodologies employed before they get to the D/DCI/IC desk. But paper flow is only one issue. An environment of discourse up front is necessary and long overdue. Feedback is one further key to this team effort. Control another. While the notion of this control and supervision may disturb the professional ego of some, I see no other way. I will present a work-flow chart at

25X1  which I believe reflect your wishes.





Issues for Consideration

1. Structure of IC Staff - One office concept.
2. Principal and collateral action - office concept.
3. IC personnel profile now? What should it be by July 1975?
4. Options for IC space arrangement.
5. IC operations center.
6. IC budget determinations.
7. Priority of IC Projects.



Tasks or Part of Tasks Addressing Commitments

(On-going and Proposed)

	<u>By IC Group</u>					
	<u>Mgmt</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u> Sec.
1. Determine which intelligence products satisfy user needs.	-	1	5	3	1	-
2. Identify new product requirements.	-	1	5	5	1	-
3. Improve product formats and production procedures.	-	-	5	3	1	-
4. Establish review procedures to test responsiveness and quality of intelligence product.	-	-	9	3	1	-
5. Issue specific planning objectives.	-	-	-	9	1	-
6. Restructure and strengthen DCI's personal staff.	3P.	-	-	4	-	-
7. Participate actively in NSCIC.	1P.	-	3	3	-	1
8. Insure USIB & IRAC have dynamic and forceful role.	4P.	1	-	7	1	1
9. Review USIB structure and direct, if necessary, change.	2P.	-	-	3	1	1
10. Upgrade quality of personnel and improve personnel management.	1P.	1	-	6	-	-
11. Support FY 1974 Budget before Congress.	-	-	-	3	-	-
12. Develop for FY 75 and beyond NFIPB recommendations.	-	4	-	9	1	-
13. Institute quarterly IRAC review of resource utilization.	-	3	2	7	-	1
14. Define and complete major issue studies.	-	4	-	9	-	-
15. Form R&D Council.	-	-	-	4	-	-

	<u>Mgmt</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u>	<u>Sec.</u>
16. Instruct R&D Council to review all R&D activity.	-	3	-	4	1	1	
17. Instruct R&D Council to recommend by 1 January our overall R&D strategy.	-	-	-	4	1	1	
18. Review and revise assignment of intelligence functions to achieve greater efficiency.	-	4	5	6	1	-	
19. Undertake specific duties to evaluate intelligence product.	-	1	8	4	1	-	
20. Undertake specific studies to eliminate marginal collection and production effort.	-	4	2	11	-	-	
21. Review indications and warning intelligence.	-	3	5	4	1	-	
22. Review ELINT processing and exploitation.	-	1	3	4	-	-	
23. Review current intelligence reporting.	-	-	6	4	1	-	
24. Review HUMINT and FSO reporting.	-	1	3	4	1	-	
25. Explore and perhaps increase usefulness of intelligence to Net Assessment.	-	1	1	4	-	-	
26./ 27. Submit report on national/tactical interface, including recommendations and get DOD/JCS support.	-	1	1	11	-	-	
28. Determine national intelligence contribution to military national/tactical.	-	-	2	9	-	-	
29. Implement USIB procedure for contingency review and update of requirements.	-	2	2	7	1	1	
30. Have DOD identify about 10 highest priority needs for technical intelligence required by planners.	-	-	1	5	-	-	
31. Prepare for NSCIC approval in Soviet & Chinese military R&D.	-	-	-	5	-	-	
32. Prepare for NSCIC approval on effectiveness of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.	-	-	1	3	-	-	

	<u>Mgmt</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u>	<u>Sec.</u>
33. Identify current user needs for foreign economic intelligence.	-	-	2	3	-	-	
34. Determine what contribution intelligence community can make to economic problem.	-	-	1	3	-	-	
35. Determine appropriate resource levels and assign collection and production responsibilities.	-	4	2	6	-	-	
36. Implement economic intelligence programs based on 33-35.	-	-	1	3	-	-	
37. Identify user needs for foreign intelligence on narcotics and terrorism; and	-	-	-	3	-	-	
38. Match intelligence community capabilities to user needs.	-	-	-	3	1	-	
39. Determine appropriate responsibilities and resource levels to be devoted to narcotics and terrorism.	-	-	-	6	-	-	
40. Develop analytic systems to evaluate contributions and costs of intelligence programs.	-	4	-	17	1	-	
41. Seek more efficient compartmentation procedures.	-	-	-	4	1	-	
42. Establish contingency plans for manpower reductions in DOD.	1P.	-	1	8	-	-	
43. Assess impact of #42 on intelligence capabilities.	-	-	-	9	1	-	
44. Increase usefulness and efficiency of COINS.	-	-	3	3	1	-	
45. Develop and implement review procedures to measure programs progress against stated objectives.	-	1	4	17	-	1	
46. Develop and implement evaluation and audit procedures to measure resource required against program output.	-	3	1	17	1	-	
47. Improve intra- and inter-agency sharing and mutual assistance in supporting functions.	2P.	4	4	12	1	-	

	<u>Mgmt</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u>
48. Develop career management objectives and procedures.	1P.	-	-	7	-	-
49. Develop and implement procedures to permit flexibility in resource reprogramming.	-	4	-	16	1	-
50. Promote R&D in manpower saving techniques.	-	-	-	4	-	-
51. Eliminate ONE and involve NIO's in estimative function.	-	-	2	3	-	-
52. Improve community reaction to crisis situations.	-	4	5	3	1	-
53. Expand technical/analytical element of IC Staff.	-	-	-	5	1	-
54. Develop overall strategy for evaluating performance of peripheral area reconnaissance operations.	-	1	-	3	-	-
55. Develop objectives for each of major components in the Agency.	-	-	1	3	-	-
56. Participation and inputs in review processes of all departments and agencies in foreign intelligence community.	1P.	1	2	13	1	-
57. Establish IRAC Information Working Group to improve CIRIS effort	-	-	1	8	1	-

Activities Proposed Against No Specified Objective

	<u>Mgmt</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u>	<u>Sec.</u>
1. Ad Hoc Studies		X					
2. COMINT Evaluation		X					
3. Evaluation of evaluation systems		X					
4. Community performance evaluation		X					
5. IRAC Issue Studies		X					
6. Planning		X					







IC FRONT OFFICE AND REGISTRY



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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.
2. Next, it is important to gather relevant information and data. This can be done through research, consultation with experts, or by analyzing existing data sets.
3. Once the information is gathered, the next step is to analyze it. This involves identifying patterns, trends, and relationships that can help in understanding the problem.
4. After analysis, the next step is to develop a solution or plan. This involves brainstorming ideas, evaluating options, and selecting the most appropriate approach.
5. The final step is to implement the solution. This involves putting the plan into action, monitoring progress, and making adjustments as needed.
6. Finally, it is important to evaluate the results of the implementation. This involves comparing the actual outcomes with the expected results and identifying areas for improvement.

IC FRONT OFFICE AND REGISTRY  
(Continued)

7. Direct and supervise activities of the USIB, IRAC and NSCIC Secretaries and special USIB Committees as assigned.

8. Guide the development of a Community Information Data System.

9. Provide direction to administrative activities, e.g., courier and registry service.



CCG TASKS

Chief (5)

- Provide leadership and guidance to CCG 8, All
- Conduct liaison with ASD(I) Deputies, Program Managers and equivalent offices 27, All
- Chair IRAC Working Group and supervise staffing for IRAC. 8, 13, (15, 16, 17)
- Maintain control of CCG projects and activities All

Planning Section (4)

- Prepare DCI program planning guidance. 5, 35, 39
- Contribute to preparation of Congressional presentations and NFIPB 11, 12
- Conduct planning for intelligence training and career development 10, 47, 48
- Identify and define issues to be studied 14
- Assist in development of intelligence objectives and requirements 2, 5, 29, 45, 30, 31

Program Review Section (16)

- Assist in development of intelligence objective and requirements 2, 5, 29, 45, 30, 31
- Recommend and coordinate the development of DCI positions on program and resource issues 14, 20, 45, 49, 56
- Define and participate in major issue studies 14, 20, 45, 49, 56
- Maintain liaison with ASD(I) Staff, ASD(C) Staff and program staffs of each program agency or department and equivalent offices as appropriate 26, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 56
- Monitor development of resource programs by each department/agency 26, 28, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 56

Participate in formal program reviews	26, 28, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 56
Participate in formal budget reviews	26, 28, 40, 42, 45, 46, 49 56
Acquire and provide to IC Staff (through Research and Analysis Section) all data and documents on all programs, budgets, issues, decisions, etc.	5, 11, 12, 14, 20, 40, 45, 49, 56
Assist in maintain currency and accuracy of data base established in Research and Analysis Section	8, 11, 12, 14, 20, 26, 28, 40
Understand the specific capabilities of the program elements, projects, and activities to respond to tasks or requirements	20, 26, 28, 40, 45, 46, 49, 56
Participate in evaluations of the effectiveness of resources, projects and activities within each program	20, 26, 28, 40, 45, 46, 49, 56
Provide inputs to planning activities developing guidance, Congressional presentations and NFIPB	5, 11, 12
Monitor training and career development programs	10, 47, 48

Research and Analysis Section (15)

Develop specifications for content, format and schedule for submission of community management information	40, 46, 57
Supervise input processing and validation of data provided by community components and program review officers	46
Develop and maintain community program fiscal files and audit trails	11, 12, 46, 49, 56

Develop and maintain data on manpower levels and utilization	5, 11, 12, 14, 18, 42 43, 45, 46, 48, 50
Conduct research and analyses of community management information in response to staff and other user needs	13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 40, 43, 46, 47, 49
Conduct analysis on intelligence training and career development activities	10, 47, 48
Conduct research and analysis to achieve community sharing and mutual assistance in supporting functions	8, 10, 13, 18, 35, 39 40, 41, 47
Respond to requests for data output from community users	40, 43, 46, 47, 49, 57
Develop systems, processes, methodologies for resource evaluations and participate in analysis	18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 29, 35, 39, 40, 45, 46, 47, 49, 57
Advise leadership on data base systems and quantitative analysis techniques	6, 8, 29, 40, 45, 53
Familiarize staff analysts on how ADP can aid them in their analysis	47, 53, 57
Conduct diagnostic analyses and other quality control processes in order to maintain and improve responsiveness of the system	46, 47, 57

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7 November 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR: 

SUBJECT: Manning Alternatives for PRG

1. Attached is a tabulation suggesting five different manning levels for PRG which you might find useful if a give-and-take on personnel adjustments develops at  conference this weekend.

STAT

2. These alternative mannings are based on the following assumptions:

a. Any geographic or topical area sufficiently important to the DCI to warrant appointment of an NIO for that area is also important enough for inclusion of an analyst specialist on that area in the PRG manning.

b. Similarly, any geographic or topical area which it is expected may warrant appointment of an NIO, or for which the DCI has indicated he is considering an NIO, also should be covered by a PRG analyst.

c. Supervisory personnel should be kept to a bare minimum if the IC Table of Organization forces PRG much below its optimum manning.

3. Matching between the proposed optimum manning of the PRG branches and the NIOs already appointed or under consideration is as follows:

PRG analysts	NIOs already appointed*	Additional NIOs the DCI has under consideration **
<u>Area Products Branch</u>		
USSR/East Europe	Soviet Union/E. Europe	
Southeast Asia	Southeast Asia	
Middle East/Med.	Middle East/Islamic World	
Western Europe/NATO	Western Europe	
Latin America	Latin America	
PRC		Northeast Asia
East Asia/West. Pacific		
South Asia/Africa		
<u>Topical Products Branch</u>		
Current/crisis reporting		
Energy matters	Energy matters	
International economics		Economic intelligence
SALT/Strategic weapons		Strategic weapons and advanced technology

PRG analysts	NIOs already appointed*	Additional NIOs the DCI has under consideration **
MBFR/General purpose forces		General purpose forces (MBFR)
Terrorism/Narcotics		
Science and technology		

4. No provision is made in the attached manning for ad hoc projects unrelated to the basic PRG mission such as [redacted] and I have been handling. I understand that as a contract employee I do not count against the PRG T/O.

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5. The five alternatives, in declining order of desirability, which are presented on the attached page, can be summarized as follows:

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6. The alternatives which already have been presented to John [redacted] for inclusion in the books being prepared for the [redacted] conference are:

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7. On reconsideration, I do not consider the "high" position of 22 is really an optimum one, as indicated in the breakout on the attached page.

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MILESTONES AND TIME SCHEDULES  
FOR CPAG ONGOING TASKS

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CPAG PROPOSED TASKS

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WORK/TIME SCHEDULE PER MAN FOR CPAG

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CPAG TASKS AND STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

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22 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : IC Responsibilities re Community Objectives - Role of  
USIB/IHC and IC/Information Handling Coordinator

1. Attached is my response to the questionnaire [REDACTED] passed out  
at our Saturday meeting.

2. Since quite a number of my responses relate to an interaction be-  
tween PRG and my activities, I am sending a copy of the attached to

[REDACTED] inviting any comments he may have.

Attachment

Original - Addressee

- 1 - [REDACTED]
- ✓ 1 - IHC Reading File
- 1 - IHC Subject File: DCI Objectives
- 1 - NCF chrono

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COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES 19 October 1973

Response of Intelligence In-  
formation Handling Committee  
or  
IC Staff Info Handling Coordinator

	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks Comments</u>
Note: Para. 1 -39 from 6 Sept. Community Objectives Para. 40-50 from draft Management Objectives Para. 51-57 from DCI report to PFIAB			
1. Determine which intel <u>products #</u> / satisfy user needs.	1 Dec.	PRG primary	IHC role in improving quality of files formatted for computer, e.g. COINS, NOIWON.
2. Identify new product requirements.	1 Dec.	PRG primary	IHC possible role in support of PRG where computerized files involved: e.g., COINS, NOIWON.
3. Improve product formats and <u>production procedures. ##/</u>	Early 1974	PRG primary	IHC role in improving quality of files formatted for computer, e.g. COINS. IHC role in improving computer manipulation capability of materials used by analysts, in support of PRG .
4. Establish review procedures to test responsiveness and quality of intel product.	31 Dec.	PRG primary	IHC role exists: e.g., participation in COINS Data Base Working Group. Review of statistics re COINS use by community.
5. Issue specific planning objectives.	Shortly		A) IHC role re COINS . B) When USIB/IHC role clarified by approval of existing or new NSCID, IHC specific ob- jectives can be spelled out.

# - "Product" is construed to include files assembled by intelligence analysts as part of their working reference materials.

## - "Production procedures" include computer manipulation capabilities of data used by analysts.

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	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
6. Restructure and strengthen DCI's personal staff .	15 Oct.	D/DCI/IC	Approve T/O for IHC
7. Participate actively in NSCIC.	-		No direct role.
8. Insure USIB & IRAC have dynamic and forceful role.	-	D/DCI/IC	Operate USIB/IHC effectively and energetically, when NSCID approved.
9. Review USIB structure and direct, if necessary, changes.	31 Dec.	D/DCI/IC	Propose draft NSCID for USIB/IHC. With D/DCI/IC approval, consult with USIB agencies on this draft. Relation with USIB/Security Comm and USIB/Telecom WG.
10. Upgrade quality of personnel and improve personnel management.	-		No direct role.
11. Support FY 74 Budget before Congress.	-		No direct role.
12. Develop for FY 75 and beyond NFIPB recommendations.	-	D/DCI/IC	Offer recommendations to D/DCI/IC for possible inclusion - re particularly the application of ADP to intelligence functions.

	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
13. Institute quarterly IRAC review of resource utilization.	-		No direct role.
14. Define and complete major issue studies.	FY 1974		No direct role.
15. Form R&D Council.	mid-Oct.	D/DCI/IC	No direct role for IHC
16. Instruct R&D Council to review all R&D activity.	-	D/DCI/IC	IHC should contribute to R&D Council re R&D activities in ADP. This is part of existing NSCID on IHC.
17. Instruct R&D Council to recommend by 1 Jan. our overall R&D strategy.	-	D/DCI/IC	Same as above.
18. Review and revise assignment of Intel functions to achieve greater efficiency.	-	D/DCI/IC	Recommend to D/DCI/IC appropriate roles for USIB/IHC and IC Staff Information Handling Coordinator.
19. Undertake specific studies to evaluate intel product.	-		On call, if requested by other IC Staff components; with particular reference to computerized data bases.

	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
20. Undertake specific studies to eliminate marginal collection and production effort.			No direct role.
In order to rationalize division of labor and increase services of common concern, review:	6 Mar. 75		
21. Indications and warning intel		PRG	Support PRG re improvement of automated data bases, capability of analysts to use automation, and communication nets for I&W.
22. ELINT processing and exploitation.			No direct role.
23. Current intel reporting.		PRG	Same as above for I&W, supporting PRG.
24. HUMINT and FSO reporting.		PRG	Same as above for I&W, supporting PRG.
25. Explore and perhaps increase usefulness of intel to Net Assessment.			No direct role.



	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
26. Submit report on national/tactical interface, including recommendations.	Jan-Mar 74		No direct role.
27. Get DOD/JCS support for #26.	-		No direct role.
28. Determine national intel contribution to military #26.	-		No direct role.
29. Implement USIB procedure for contingency review and update of requirements.	-		No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re development of automated procedures.
30. Have DOD identify about 10 highest priority needs for technical intel required by planners.	1 Nov.		No direct role.
Prepare for NSCIC approval intel production programs in:	Jan-Mar 74		
31. Soviet & Chinese military R&D.			No direct role.
32. Effectiveness of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.			No direct role.

		<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u>
				<u>Comments</u>
33.	Identify current user needs for foreign economic intel.	Oct-Dec 73		No direct role.
34.	Determine what contribution intel community can make to economic problem.	Oct-Dec 73		No direct role.
35.	Determine appropriate resource levels and assign collection and production responsibilities.	Oct-Dec 73		No direct role.
36.	Implement economic intel programs based on #33-35.	31 Mar 74		No direct role.
37.	Identify user needs for foreign intel on narcotics and terrorism.	-		No direct role.
38.	Match intel community capabilities to user needs (#37).	-		No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.
39.	Determine appropriate responsibilities and resource levels to be devoted to narcotics and terrorism.	1 Jan 74		No direct role.

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	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Hndlg Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
40. Develop analytic systems to evaluate contributions and costs of intel programs.	-		No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.
41. Seek more efficient compartmentation procedures.	-		IHC has role in computer security problem.
42. Establish contingency plans for manpower reductions in DOD.	-		No direct role.
43. Assess impact of #42 on intel capabilities.	-		No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.
44. Increase usefulness and efficiency of COINS.	-	IHC under D/DCI/IC	(IHC Tasks include: A) Participate in Data Base Working Gp. B) Monitor ASD(I) as Exec. Agt for COINS C) Maintain contact with Project Ofc communication netting. D) Obtain DCI/IC consultants and work with them. E) Participate in any CIA reviews. F) Support D/DCI/IC in PFIAB.
45. Develop and implement review procedures to measure programs progress against stated objectives.	-		45. No direct role.
46. Develop and implement evaluation and audit procedures to measure resources required against program output.	-		46. No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.

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	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Handling Tasks</u>
			<u>Comments</u>
47. Improve intra- and inter-agency sharing and mutual assistance in supporting functions.	-		IHC Tasks include: A) <u>Monitor and report on inter-agy planning and operation of IDHS networks.</u> B) Ditto re analyst files. C) Ditto re education and training for community ADP and Information Sciences D) Ditto re computer security. E) Ditto re data standards (now an USIB/IHC responsibility per NSCID 1/15).
48. Develop career management objectives and procedures.	-		48. No direct role.
49. Develop and implement procedures to permit resource reprogramming flexibility.	-		49. No direct role. Possible technical advice and support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.
50. Promote R&D in manpower saving techniques.	-		50. No direct role.
51. Eliminate ONE and involve NIOs in estimative function.	-		No direct role.
52. Improve community reaction to crisis situations.	-		Support PRG re improvement of automated data bases, capability of analysts to use automation, and communication nets for use in crisis situations.
53. Expand technical/analytical element of IC Staff.	-		No direct role. Possible support to such element thru dvlpmt of automated procedures to support analysis.

	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>IC Action Responsibility</u>	<u>Relation to Intel Info Handling Tasks</u> <u>Comments</u>
--	-----------------	---------------------------------	---

- |     |   |             |  |
|-----|---|-------------|--|
| 54. | Develop overall strategy for evaluating performance of peripheral area reconnaissance operations.           | -           | No direct role.  |
| 55. | Develop objectives for each of major components in the Agency.  | -           | No direct role.  |
| 56. | IC participation and inputs in review processes of all departments and agencies in foreign intel community. | -           | No direct role. Possible technical support re dvlpmt of automated procedures.  |
| 57. | Establish IRAC Information Working Group to improve CIRIS effort.   | mid-Dec. 73 | Since CIRIS is a community info hndlg system, existing NSCID gives IHC a role. What role, if any, to play in practice is a policy judgment for D/DCI/IC. |

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24 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Managerial Functions in the IC Program

1. The purpose of this paper is to outline a program for a small IC management group or staff. The projects included in the discussion are themselves the argument for the need for such a group. However, the greatest need for such a group is in the continuing analysis of the intelligence community management problem, coordinating the IC effort, and taking on those projects which are truly management oriented and do not pertain to our three main IC groups.

2. Community Objectives, 19 October 1973. I suggest that several of the objectives listed represent the logical framework for an IC management group program. These are as follows:

A. Objective 9. Review USIB structure and direct, if necessary, changes.

B. Objective 10. Upgrade quality of personnel and improve personnel management.

C. Objective 18. Review and revise assignment of intelligence functions to achieve greater efficiency.

D. Objective 41. Seek more efficient compartmentation procedures.

E. Within the Context of existing program managers, (management) objectives 47 and 48, having to do with improving and supporting functions and developing career management objectives and procedures. These can be related back to Objective 10.

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3. ~~Approved For Release 2005/03/30 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000400120028-2~~  
tasks which I believe are essential to the success of the IC effort.

A. DCID Preparation and Revision. As I noted in my paper on the Gap Between Management Policy and Implementation there is a need to implement the policy changes of November 1971 and thereafter. Nowhere is this need more felt than in updating current DCIDs and issuing new ones to account for policy change implementation such as exist via the birth of the IC Staff, the NIO and the IRAC efforts. Such changes as we may make in the USIB Committee structure also require DCID revisions.

The DCIDs are our operating bureaucratic statutes. To put it in another way, they are our rules of engagement. Without them we are inclined to have a form of bureaucratic anarchy.

B. Action Office System. Within our own IC Staff I am recommending that we set up and use a modified form of the action office system currently in use in OSD. The action office system affixes explicit responsibility for all actions and provides for specific coordination and feedback measures. It is a simple system and the management group can quickly set up procedures within IC. In addition, I recommend that we expand the action office system to USIB Committee actions, thereby integrating USIB Committee effort and closing the loop with all IC problems. To this end I further recommend that the USIB and IRAC Secretariats be included in the IC management group.

C. Management Information Center. Your concept of an IC management center will require that all of our IC projects be displayed in an integrated fashion showing schedules, primary and collateral action offices and other pertinent data. I recommend that the management group be tasked to maintain such a center.

D. Improved Personnel Management/Development. With regard to Objective 10, Defense has initiated a new "DOD-Wide Civilian Career Program" for general intelligence personnel which appears to be an excellent response to the President's call "to upgrade analyst personnel" by providing "more rewarding careers for intelligence personnel." I believe that we could use this program as a starting vehicle to meld the community into a single, viable program which would insure the development of a professionally competent and highly


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motivated Intelligence Community work force, one which would permit inter-community movement of personnel during the course of their careers. Of course, the ongoing training study would be a natural adjunct to this program and accordingly should be moved from the IC/PRG to the management group.

E. Contingencies. Finally, in the instance of such items as PFIAB reports, the Murphy Commission, Objective 41, and like matters, the management group can play a key role as primary action office for IC.

  
Chief,  
Special Projects Branch, PRG/IC

WES/lah

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Tasks On-Going or Proposed by Groups

	<u>D/D</u>	<u>CCG</u>	<u>PRG</u>	<u>PEG</u>	<u>IHC</u>	<u>USIB</u>	<u>Proposed Mgmt *</u>	<u>Total</u>
Product Improvement	-	-	10	1	11	-	-	22
Community Direction and Innovation	9	15	7	1	7	-	3	42
Community Structure	-	1	1	1	4	2	1	10
Resources including specific reference to personnel	-	9	1	-	5	-	1	16
Special	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	10	34	25	11	28	2	5	115

\*Work program for this group includes centralized attention to PFIAB reporting, DSCID's review and preparation, etc., currently being undertaken ad hoc elsewhere in IC.

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Discussion Paper [ ] Meeting

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Subject: Profile of Professional Capability in the IC Staff

1. The attached charts are an effort to show the distribution of skills, background and experience of the staff officers in the three IC Staff groups. Because of the limited information available to me on the backgrounds of these officers, there are undoubtedly numerous errors of omission and perhaps a few of commission. In spite of these, I believe the charts can be useful in displaying in broad outline the kinds of talent arrayed against our responsibilities. It will hopefully also provide insights that will be helpful in future management decisions. The following are possible examples:

a. Of the [ ] people covered, only [ ] have significant experience in the HUMINT field.

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b. Of the [ ] have no intelligence background and three have no military background.

c. Of the [ ] has any professional experience (except teaching) outside the intelligence and military areas.

d. In the area of academic disciplines and experience, PRG is particularly strong in the area of Political Science and Public Administration, weak in Economic and Business Administration. PEG is very heavily weighted in Science. CCG is relatively evenly balanced in all areas.

2. A word on definitions:

a. In the first three categories I have included people who have had a "significant degree of experience" in the intelligence business, in the military, or in some other profession.



b. In the next bloc of six categories I have included people who have had either significant academic experience or actual experience.

c. In the third bloc I have included what seems to me to be the major functional categories of the intelligence business. (I purposely omitted "Management" because I saw no way of determining with any accuracy whether most of the people in the Staff had management skills that were significant or pertinent to the Staff's responsibilities.)

d. I included the final category on Overseas on the assumption that such experience was germane and significant for an organization concerned with foreign intelligence.

3. Questions:

a. Can this display, assuming better data and perhaps a more refined definition of the categories, be a useful management tool?

b. Do we have the right mix and distribution of talents in the IC Staff?



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